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It is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum 
differential game solve the respective upper and lower Isaacs’ equations in the 
viscosity sense (introduced by Crandall and Lions (Trans. Amer. Math. Sot. 277 
(1983), l-42). Since such solutions are unique, this yields a fairly simple proof that 
the game has value should the minimax condition hold. As a further application of 
viscosity techniques, a new and simpler proof that the upper and lower values can 
be approximated by the values of certain games with Lipschitz controls is given. 
1. INTRODUCTION: V~scosrr~ SOLUTIONS 
Recent work of Crandall and Lions 151, expanded upon in Lions [ 141 and 
later reformulated and simplified in part by Crandall, Evans, and Lions [4], 
has introduced a new notion of generalized solutions for certain fully 
nonlinear, first-order partial differential equations. For the Hamilton-Jacobi 
equation in particular these new, so-called viscosity solutions exist and, more 
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importantly, are unique under a wide variety of hypotheses. A major 
advance here beyond previous work (cf. Benton [ 3 1) is the elimination of any 
requirement that the nonlinearities be convex. 
Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate the utility of viscosity solution 
methods in studying various problems in two-person zero-sum differential 
game theory and to rederive with greatly simplified proofs some of the main 
results of Fleming [7], Friedman [8, 91, and Barron [ 1, 21. (Notice, 
however, that our hypotheses are stronger in several instances.) 
Some definitions and historical remarks are appropriate here. A 
differential game comprises an ordinary differential equation of the form 
(ODE) 
$p = I-(& x(s), Y(S), z(s)), tcs<T, 
x(t) =x, 
where y(a) and z(.) are the controls exercised by players y and z, and an 
associated payoff 
P> PM.). 4.)) = g@(T)) + jr W, x(s), Y(S), z(s)) ds. 
(Full definitions are provided in Sect. 21) The goal of y is to maximize P and 
the goal of z is to minimize P. The basic mathematical question is to 
discover, if possible, optimal strategies y and z should employ. 
This last problem is difficult and need not in general have any very good 
solution. Nevertheless, Isaacs in [lo] (cf. also [ 111) initiated the study of 
(ODE), (P) by dynamic programming methods, already applied by 
R. Bellman to control (= one-person game) problems. The idea, loosely 
speaking, is first to define V(t, x) as the payoff of the game above, provided J’ 
and z each play optimally, and next to discover a PDE that V formally 
satisfies. Then, conversely, should we find a smooth enough solution of this 
PDE, it must equal V; and a further analysis of the PDE leads to the 
synthesis of optimal controls for y and z. We will not address here this last, 
important aspect of the theory and refer the reader instead to [8]. 
There are profound difficulties in making rigorous the procedure outlined 
above. Fleming in [7] and after him Friedman [8, 91, Elliott and Kalton [6], 
and others have undertaken this task. Here we will follow Friedman and his 
definition of the upper value Vt and the lower value VP associated with the 
game: these correspond to the limits of certain discrete approximations, in 
the first of which y and in the second of which z has an advantage. (See 
Sect. 2 for complete definitions.) Friedman [8, 9] has shown that V* are 
Lipschitz, that V’ solves Isaacs’ equation (I+) (defined in Sect. 2) a.e. and 
that V- solves Isaacs’ equation (I-) a.e. These facts alone are not 
particularly useful as there are in general several distinct functions solving 
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these equations a.e. This last difftculty pervades much of the existing game 
theory literature. 
Our contribution here is to show in Theorem 3.1 that V* are viscosity 
solution of (I * ), an important fact as such solutions are unique. A simple 
consequence is that I’+ = V-, and so the game has value, should the 
minimax (or Isaecs’) condition hold; see Corollary 3.2. This last assertion 
was first proved by Fleming [7] using a rather complicated approximation 
via stochastic differential games; see also Friedman 191. Souganidis [ 151 has 
independently obtained similar results, ’ and Lions [ 14 ] had earlier observed 
the connections between dynamic programming and viscosity solutions for 
control problems. 
As a further demonstration of viscosity solution methods we present in 
Section 4 a greatly simplified proof of Barron’s result [ 11 that V* can be 
approximated by the values of games with Lipschitz controls. An analogous 
assertion for nondegenerate stochastic differential games has been established 
by Jensen I12 ) (cf. also Jensen and Lions [ 13 I). 
We conclude by recording here the relevant definitions and properties of 
viscosity solutions. 
Assume H: 10, TI x D”’ x R”’ + IFi is continuous, and g: R”’ + R is 
bounded, uniformly continuous. A bounded, uniformly continuous function 
U: IO, TI x Vm + G is called a viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi 
equation 
PJ) 
u, + H(t, x, Du) = 0 in (0, 7) x R”. (1.1) 
u(K x) = ‘d-x) in IRm, (1.2) 
provided (1.2) holds and for each # E C’((0, T) X Rm), 
(a) if u - $ attains a local maximum at (to, x0) E (0, r) x mm, then 
4,(to 3 x0> + wo 5 x0 3 wto 7 x0>> 2 0 (1.3) 
and 
(b) if u - 4 attains a local minimum at (to, x0) E (0, r) x Rm, then 
#ito 3 xo) + H(to 3 xo 3 W(to 3 x0>> < 0. (1.4) 
See [4] for a proof that if u is a viscosity solution of (HJ) and if u is 
differentiable at some point (to, x0), then 
u&J, .q)> + fqt,, x0, Du(t,, x0)) = 0. 
I Souganidis’ proof is similar to and antedates ours by several months; the priority of 
discovery is his. 
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Assume next 
/ H(t, x, P) - H(f, x7 fill< c I P - $1, 
lH(t,~,P~--H(~,f,P~l~~~l~-~I+l~-~l~~~+IPl~ 
(1.5) 
for all x, 2, p, 5 E R”, 0 < t, t”< T, and some constant C. Then there exists 
at most one viscosity solution of (HJ): this uniqueness assertion is the prin- 
cipal result of [5]. 
Remarks. We have described here the appropriate definition for the 
terminal value problem (l.l), (1.2); this is, as we shall see, the kind of PDE 
arising in game theory applications. A viscosity solution of the initial value 
problem (1. 1 ), 
u(x, 0) = g(x) in R”, (1.2’) 
is defined by reversing the inequalities in (1.3), (1.4). 
Note from [S] that uniqueness for viscosity solutions of (HJ) holds under 
various weaker assumptions than (1 S). Also, the simplified uniqueness proof 
given in [4] (for the case that H is independent of (t, x)) extends without 
much trouble to the present situation.’ 
2. THE UPPER AND LOWER VALUES 
Fix T > t > 0, x E R”, and consider then the ordinary differential equation 
(ODE) 
X(f) = x. 
and 
z(a) : [t, T] + Z 
are given measurable functions (called the controls employed by players y 
and z, respectively) and Y c Rk, Z c R’ are given compact subsets, the 
control sets. In addition we will assume 
f: [O,T]XlR”XYXZ-R” 
’ Note added in proof A forthcoming paper by Evans and Souganidis (Indiana Univ. Math. 
J., to appear) simplifies much of the following by adapting the approach of Elliott-Kalton [6] 
to differential games. 
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is uniformly continuous and satisfies 
If(t, x, Y, z>l < c, 2 
If(t,x,Y,Z)-f(t,~,Y1z>l~c,IX-~I 
(2.1) 
for some constant C, and all 0 < t < T, x, 2 E Rm, y E Y, z E 2. 
Then for each pair of controls y(.) and z(.) (ODE) has a unique, 
absolutely continuous solution x(+), called the response of the system to the 
controls y(.) and z(s). 
Associated with these dynamics is the payoff 
P> P(Y(.), 4.1) = g(x(T)) +!” W, x(s), Y(S), z(s)) dss, 
I 
where g: Rm -+ R satisfies 
I g(x)1 Gc* ) 
I g(x) - id4 G c* Ix - 4 
and h: [0, T] x Rm x Y x Z + R is uniformly continuous and satisfies 
Ia x7 Y, z>I < c,, 
I w, x, Y, z> - w, $9 Y, z>I < c, lx - 21 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
for some constant C, and all 0 < t < T, x, i E R”, y E Y, z E Z. 
The goal of player y is to maximize P and the goal of player z is to 
minimize P. How should these players choose their controls? 
As noted in Section 1, one major approach to this problem, initiated by 
Isaacs [IO] and made rigorous by Fleming [ 71, Friedman [ 8, 91, and Elliott 
and Kalton [6], consists of studying the value functions I’* and the PDE 
they satisfy. 
We begin with a number of definitions taken from [ 81. 
Choose first a positive integer n and then define 
Divide [t, T] into n subintervals 
zjE(fIfj-*<t<tj} (j= l,.‘.,n), 
where 
tj = t + jS (j = 0, . ’ . , n). 
Let Yj (resp. Zj) denote the set of all measurable mappings from Ij into Y 
(resp. Z); we will identify any two such mappings which agree a.e. 
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Next, denote by rs3j any map from Z, X Y, X ... X Zjp, X YjP, X Zj into 
Yj. Any collection 
rs 2% (I-,..., I-) 
is then called an upper d-strategy for y. Furthermore, 
As = (A’,‘,..., Asqn) 
is an upper d-strategy for z, where for each j, As3j is any map from 
Y, x z, x *** X yjp* X Zj~l X Yj into Zj. 
Similarly, a lower b-strategy for y is a collection 
where r,,, is any function in Y, and rs,j (j = 2, . *. , n) is any mapping from 
Y, x z, x **. x Y,-, x Zj-, into Yj. A 1 ower &strategy for z is a collection 
A, = (A,,, ,..., As,,), 
where As,, is any function in Z, and A,,, j (j = 2, . ’ . , n) is any mapping from 
Z, X Y, X se* X Zjel X yip, into Zj. 
Given a pair (As, r”) as above we define the controls y’(-), zs(.), with 
components yj, zj on Ij, this way: 
and 
zj=As,l, y, = Pl(z,) 
Zj=As,j(Zl, Yl>***, Zj-1, Yj-l>, 
Yj = Wz, 3 YI T.**) zj- 19 Yj- 13 zj> 
for j = 2, . * . , n. Call (y”(.), zg(.)) the outcome of (As, r”) and denote by 
x”(.) the corresponding solution of (ODE). We also write 
W,, rS1 = P(Y”CX ZS(‘)) 
to denote the associated payoff. 
Given a pair (I-,, As) we similarly define x6(.), ys(.), zs(.), P[r,, A’]. 
Finally let us set 
V” = inf sup P[A,, Ts] = sup inf P[A,, T’]. 
As f-6 I-6 Aa 
This is the upper d-value, and the second equality here is [8, Theorem 1.4.11. 
Analogously, 
V,-infsupP(T,,AS]=supinfP[rS,AS] 
Aa r6 Ts AS 
is the lower d-value. 
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See [S, Theorems 1.4.3 and 1.4.41 for proofs that 
for 6, = (T - t)/n, 6, = (T - t)/m, m = kn, k > 1. Hence 
and 
exist; call Vt the upper value of the differential game and V- the lower 
value. 
We will write Vs = Vs(t, x), Vs = Vs(t, x), V* = V* (t, x) to display the 
dependence on (t, x) in (ODE) and (P). 
According to [8, Theorem 2.6.41, 
vyt, x) + v+ (t, x), 
V&9 x) + v- (4 x) 
uniformly for (t, x) contained in compact subsets of [0, T) x R”, 6, = 
(T- ryn, n = 1, 2 ,.... 
3. VISCOSITY SOLUTIONS OF ISAACS' EQUATIONS 
It is known- and we will reprove this below-that V* are uniformly 
Lipschitz continuous, are thus differentiable almost everywhere, and satisfy 
a.e. Isaac? equations 
(I+) 
I 
v; + H+(t, x, DV+) = 0 (O,<t< T, XE Rrn) 
v+ (T x) = g(x) 
and 
I 
v; +H-(t,x,DV-)=0 (O,<t< T, xE Rm) 
(I- 1 
V- (T, x) = g(x), 
where 
and 
H- (t, x, p) = y:; y$ {j-(4 x, y, z) . p + A(& X, Y, Z) 1 
are, respectively, the upper and lower Hamiltonians. 
?05 ‘3 2 7 
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Our principal assertion is that V* in fact satisfy Isaacs’ equations in the 
viscosity sense. 
THEOREM 3.1. Vi is the viscosity solution of (I+) and V- is the 
viscosity solution of (II). 
COROLLARY 3.2. If for all 0 < t < T, x, p E R”, 
H+(t, x, P) = H-Q, x, P>, (minimax condition) 
then 
v+ E v-. 
In this case we say the game has a value V E Vi. 
Corollary 3.2 is an immediate consequence of the uniqueness of viscosity 
solutions; note that H* satisfy (1.5). 
Proof 3 (of Theorem 3.1.). We will prove V- is a viscosity solution of 
(II); the proof for V+ is similar. 
Assume 4 E C’ and VP - 4 attains a local maximum at some point 
(to, x,,) E (0, 7) x Rm. We must show 
Mo 7 xo> + H- (to 3 xo > 4Wo 9 xo)) > 0. 
Suppose to the contrary this inequality fails; then 
#Jt,, x0) + H- (to, x0, D#(to, x0)) < -8 < 0 
for some 0 > 0. 
Set 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
where n is a positive integer to be selected later. 
The principle of optimality for d-games [8, p. 1281 states 
","P $f V&O + &,X&o + E)) - V&,x,) 
+ jt;” h(s, xg(s), y&j, z'(s)) ds 1 = 0, (3.3) 
’ This proof is in part modelled on Friedman [S, pp. 127-1311. 
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where E = k8 for some positive integer k, t, + E < T, r, and As are 6- 
strategies on the interval t, < s < t, + E, (y,(m), z”(e)) is the outcome of 
(r,, A’), and x8(.) is the solution of (ODE) for t, < s < t, + E corresponding 
to y,, zs and the initial condition x8(&) = x0. 
Now by Lemma 3.3(a), proved below, it follows from (3.2) that for all 
sufficiently small 6 and E there exists an upper d-strategy As, such that for 
any lower d-strategy I-, 
+ h(s, x8(s), y,(s) z’(s)) ds < - $ E. (3.4) 
But 
wo + E, 4, + E)) - 4(4ll x0) 
(3.5) 
=i 
to+& 
US, x&)1 + f(s, x&), Y,(S), z%)) . W(s, x&)1 ds, 
to 
by (ODE). In addition, since V- - 4 has a local maximum at (to, x0), we 
have 
v-(&j + &,X&, + E)) - v-(t,, .q)) 
G e2 + G x&o + El) - f&o, x0), 
provided E is small enough. This estimate, (3.4), and (3.5) together imply 
v- (to + 6 4, + &>> - v- (to, x0) 
toi& 
+ 
i to 
h(s, xg(s), Y&>, z’(s)) ds < - $ E. 
Thus 
sup inf i V-(t, + e, xs(t, + 6)) - V-(t,, x0) 
T8 A* 1 
+I 
to+& 
h(s, q(s), y,(s), z’(s)) ds 
to 
< - ;E 
for all sufficiently small 6 and E. Now 
v, (t x) -+ v- n ’ as n-, co, 
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uniformly for (t, x) contained in compact subsets of [0, 7) x IF?“‘, 6, = 
(T- t)/n. Thus we may choose some small E > 0 and then choose 6 = 6, = 
(T- t&n, E = k,& so that 
sup inf V,(t, + 6 xs(t, + E)) - VJt,, x0) 
Ts Aa I 
This contradicts the optimality principle (3.3) and thereby proves (3.1). 
Now assume VP - 4 attains a local minimum at (to, x,). We must prove 
Mo 7 xo> + H- (to 2 xo 7 @(to 9 xo)) < 0, (3.6) 
and will therefore assume on the contrary that 
Ml, 3 xo) + H- (to, x,W(fo, xo>) > 6 > 0 (3.7) 
for some 13 > 0. 
Then there exists for all sufftciently small 6 = (T - t)/n and E = k6 a lower 
d-strategy r,, such that for each a-strategy As we have 
s 
tg+c h(s, -G(s)) + f(s, x&h Y&)> z’(s)) . Dd(s, xg(s)) *a 
+ h(s, xg(s), Y,(S), z’(s)> ds > + E; (3.8) 
this is Lemma 3.3(b). Since 
v- (4l + e, x&J + E)) - v- (to 3x0) 
a #(to + E> x&o + El) - fwo, x0> 
if E is small enough, we may reason as above to arrive at the contradiction 
sup inf I Va(to + e, xs(to + e)) - Vs(to, x0) 
rs Aa 1 
for some sufficiently small 6, e > 0. I 
LEMMA 3.3. Assume 4 E C’. 
(a) If 4 satisfies (3.2), then there exists for all suflciently small 6 and 
E an upper a-strategy As such that (3.4) holds for each lower a-strategy Ts. 
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(b) If4 satisfies (3.7), then there exists for all sufficiently small 6 and 
e a lower &strategy r, that (3.8) holds for each upper &strategy As. 
Proof: Set 
A@, x, Y, z> = Qt(t, xl + S(t, x, Y, z> . @W, xl + h(t, x, Y, z>. 
(a) According to (3.2) we have 
~~~~~~n(fo,x,,Y,Z)~-8(0. (3.9) 
This implies that for each y E Y there exists z E 2 such that 
A(4), x0, Y, z) < -8. 
As A is uniformly continuous, in fact 
for all v E B( y, r) n Y and some r = r(y) > 0. Since Y is compact, there 
thus exist distinct points y,, .‘., y, E Y, z,, .‘., z, E Z, and r,, .*., r, > 0 
such that 
Yc ij B(Yi, ri) 
ill 
and 
4fo,xoJ>Zi)~-~ for all rEB(y,, ri)n Y, i= l,.‘.,n. 
Define 4: Y + Z by setting 
whenever y E B( yk, rk)\U “1: B( yi, ri). Then 
and in fact 
A(4 x(t), Y> Q(Y)) < - $ (3.10) 
for all y E Y, to < t < to + E, and any solution x(+) of (ODE) (with initial 
condition x(to) = x, and any controls y(e), z(.)), provided E > 0 is fixed to be 
sufficiently small. 
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It is easy to check that 4(y(t)) is a measurable mapping for any 
measurable function y(t). 
Now choose any sufficiently small 6 = 6, = (T - Q/n, E = kd, and let 
r, = (r&l ,***, r,,,) be a lower b-strategy on [t,, t, + E]. Write 
Y, = u*(t) = r,,, 0 E 1,) 
and then define 
Y, = Y2W = T,.,(Yl) 21) (t E 12) 
we set 
zz = -Q(t) = !eY2(0) = AYY, 3 z13 Y*) 
We continue in this way to define 
(t E Id* 
z.=z.(~)=qh(y.(t))=A~*~(y 
J J J 13 Zll. *.) Yj> Cc E Ij> 
for j= 3, :., k. Now let (y,(.), z’(.)) be the outcome of (r,, As) and x8(.) 
the corresponding solution of (ODE). In light of (3.10), we have 
for all t, < t < t, + E, and so (3.4) holds. 
(b) Next assume that (3.7) is valid: 
(3.11) 
Then there exists some y* E Y such that for all z E Z, 
A(4l,xcl, y*, z> > 0. 
Since A is uniformly continuous we have also 
A(& x(t), Y *, z) > 4 (3.12) 
for all z E Z, t, < t Q t, + E, and any solution x(e) of (ODE) (with initial 
condition x(&J = x and any controls y(.). z(.)) povided E > 0 is fixed to be 
small enough. 
DIFFERENTIALGAMES AND SOLUTIONS 225 
Now select any sufficiently small 6 = 6, = (T - t&/n, E = k8, and define 
the lower b-strategy r, = (r,,, , .‘. , r,,,) on [to, t, + E] by setting 
rs,j = y” (j= 1, :., k). 
Let As be any upper d-strategy on [t,, t, + E], (y,(.), z’(.)) the outcome 
of (Ts, A’), and x8(.) the corresponding solution of (ODE). In view of (3.12) 
we have 
A@, x,(t), Y&>, m) > 4 
for all t, < t < t, + E, and so (3.8) is valid. 1 
4. AN APPLICATION: 
APPROXIMATION BY GAMES WITH LIPSCHITZ CONTROLS 
Consider now the differential game 
I 
W) ~ = u(s) 
ds 
\ X(f) = x, YW = Y3 z(t) = z, 
where x E R “‘, y E R k, and z E R ’ are given. Here 
u(e): [t, T] -+ u” = {u E Rk 1 /uI GM} 
and 
are the controls, and (x(a), y(.), z(.)) the corresponding response of the 
system. 
The associated payoff is 
Wd.), 4.1) = i+(T)) + CT h(s, x(s), Y(S), z(s)) ds. 
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We will assume 
If(~,x,Y,Z)-f(t:~,8,~)l~C~(I~-il+lX-~I+IY-ynl+IZ-~/), 
I g(x)1 G c, 5 
I&>-~~~~l~c,lx--l5 
(4.2) 
and 
I& -5 Y, z>l < c, 3 
(4.3) ~h(t,x,y,z)-h(t:~,yn,~)~~CC3(~t-tl~+/X-~~+~/-~ynl+~Z-i~), 
for some constant C, and all O,< t, i< T, x, 2E R”, y, j?~ Rk, z, .ZE R’. 
In this situation we have 
H + (6 4 Y, z, P, 9, r) 
= ,yFL ,;;; LtV, x, y, z> . p + u . 9 + u . r + W, x, Y, 2)) \ 
=f(~,x,y,z).P+~IqI-Ll~l+h(t,x,y,z) 
and 
H- (6 x, Y, z, P, q, r) 
= ,;yM ,y$L LO& x, y, z> . p + u . 4 + u . r + W, x, .h z>l , 
=f(t,x,y,z).P+MIql--l/l+h(t,x,y,z) 
forallO~t~T,x,pER”,y,qERk,z,rER’.Hence 
H+ z Hp. 
so that Corollary 3.2 implies the differential game to have a value 
V M,L = VMqL(t, x, y, z). 
Notice that 
)V”& < C,(T+ 1) by (4.2), (4.3). 
Now from Theorem 3.1 we deduce 
THEOREM 4.1. V”,L is the (unique) viscosity solution of 
V ;“,” + f(t, x, y, z) + D, V”‘,L + M ) D, VM7L I - L ) D, V”,L 1 
(PJ) + h(t, x, y, z) = 0 (O<t<T, (x,y,z)ERmik+‘). 
VMqL(T, x, y, z) = g(x). 
(4.4) 
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Our problem (ODE’), (P’) . is a model of a differential game in which the 
players y and z are constrained to choose Lipschitz controls v(.) and z(s) 
(the Lipschitz constant for y is M and for z is L). Notice that control of the 
derivatives u(.) and u(e) is equivalent to direct control of y(.) and z(v) in this 
case. 
Now it seems clear heuristically that if M, L + co, that is, if the Lipschitz 
constraints on the derivatives of y(a) and z(.) are relaxed, then our problem 
(ODE’), (P’) should in some sense converge to a problem like that studied in 
Section 3 and therefore V”“,l~ should converge to the solution of some PDE 
similar to (I +) or (I -). 
Barron in [ 1, 21 has formulated and proved via game theory techniques 
various assertions of this kind. As an application of the new viscosity 
solution methods we present here a new (and simpler) proof of one of the 
principal results from [I]. First we need 
LEMMA 4.1. Under the above assumptions VM3L is uniformly Lipschitz 
and so differentiable a.e., with the estimate 
1 VygL 1, /D, V”‘,’ 1, 1 D, F”SL /, /D, V”,L 1 < C,, (4.5) 
for some constant C,, independent of M and L. In particular, V”,L solves 
(I”,L) a.e. 
Proof Let us temporarily suppose that h g, h are smooth functions 
satisfying (4.1)-(4.3). Fix E > 0 and set 
/w/,-(/w12+&)“2. 
Consider now this (backwards) parabolic approximation to (IJVqL): 
(I”) 
i 
V::+f.D,VE+MIDyVEls-LID,VEI,+h+&dVE=O, 
w, Y, z, r) = g(x). 
According to standard PDE theory there exists a unique smooth solution 
v” = pM,L of (I’). We will prove the stated bounds (4.5) for V” and later 
send e + 0. 
Define 
W = e”‘(l D, VI2 + l), 
where ;1 > 0 is a constant to be selected later. Then 
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and 
Set 
Vii uj- (ID,vy + &)“2 (1 <j<k) 
and 
Next differentiate (I’) with respect to xi : 
V$+f ~D,V~i+Ma~D,V~,-Lb~D,V~i+~AV~i 
= -Q - .f,,D, v” (1 <i<m). 
Thus we may compute 
LW-W,+~~D,W+M~~D,W-L~~D,W+EAW 
=Ae*‘(lD,VEI* + 1) + 2e”(& IDD,VE/2 + &V&AV;J 
+ 28V3 Vii, + f .‘D, Vii + Ma . D, Vii - Lb . D, Vii) 
> e*‘(A ID, PI2 + k - 2V;i(-hxi - fxi. D, V”)) (by (4.6)) 
> 0, 
(4.6) 
provided L = n(C,) is large enough. Consequently the maximum principle 
implies that 
SUP W(x, Y, z, t) = sup Wx, y, z, 7’) = eAT(lID, g/l* + 1). 
X,Y.Z,f X,Y,Z 
As the latter quantity is bounded according to (4.3), we have obtained global 
bounds on W and thus on ID, V”1, independently of L, M, E. 
Estimates for ID, VI, /D, V&I, and I Vfl have similar proofs once the bound 
for ID, VI is established. Note in particular that the estimate for / Vfl depends 
on ID, 4 + E I 41. 
Since the bounds above are independent of E > 0, there exists sj \ 0 and a 
function p such that 
1 
v”i+ V locally uniformly. 
Now according to arguments like those in [4, 51, P is the (unique) viscosity 
solution of (I”*L). Hence ?= VMqt and in fact 
VE+ vMqL locally uniformly. 
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Furthermore V”,L inherits the uniform gradient bounds, so that (4.4) holds 
for some C, = C,(C,, T), independent of M, L. We conclude the proof by 
approximating, if necessary f, g, and h by smooth functions satisfying 
(4.1)-(4.3). I 
Remark. Under assumption (4.9) below, game theoretic arguments imply 
the additional estimates 
for some constant C, = C,(C,, L) (cf. [ 121). See also Barron [2] for a game 
theoretic proof of Lemma 4.1. 
We now propose to investigate the limit of VMvL as M, L -+ co. For this let 
us take 
Y={y~IR~]O<y~<l,j=l,..., k}, (4.7) 
z = (z E R’ / 0 < zj < 1, j = l)...) 1). (4.8) 
We will assume in addition to (4.1)-(4.3) that 
f and h are periodic, with period 1, as functions 
ofyj(l <j<k) and zj(l <j<I). (4.9) 
This implies, by uniqueness, that VMyL is l-periodic in y and z as well. 
THEOREM 4.2. Under the above hypotheses, 
lim lim VM3’* = V+ (4.10) 
L-00 w-cc 
and 
lim lim V”,L = VP, (4.11) 
M+m L-cc 
where V’ and I/- are the upper and lower values associated with the 
differential game (ODE), (P), for Y, Z defined by (4.7), (4.8). 
ProoJ We will prove that 
Wr lim lim V”,‘~ 
I.+rn M+cc 
exists and that W is the (unique) viscosity solution of (I+). Thus W = V’ by 
Theorem 3.1. The proof for VP is similar. 
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First, in view of the estimates (4.4) and (4.5) there exist Mj-+ co and a 
uniformly bounded Lipschitz function VL such that 
V”iqL + VL locally uniformly. 
Furthermore equation (IMqL), which holds a.e., implies also 
(4.12) 
ID,Pq <g. 
.I 
Thus 
D, V’. = 0 a.e. 
and therefore VL = VL(t, x, z) does not depend on y. 
We claim that VL is the (unique) viscosity solution of 
(IL) I V~+~~x{f.DxVL+h}-LIDiV~/=O, vL (T, x, z) = g(x). 
To prove this let us first suppose $ is a C’ function of (t, x, z) and that 
VL - $ attains a local maximum at (t,, x0, zO), 0 < t, < T. We may assume 
in fact that this is a strict local maximum (cf. [ 51). Owing then to (4.12), for 
all sufficiently large j there exist (tj, xj, yj, zj) (with yj E Y) such that 
V”jsL - $ has a local maximum at (tj, xj, yj, zj) and (tj, xj, zj) + (t,, x0, zO) 
asj+ 00. Since V”‘j,L is the viscosity solution of (I“‘jV”), we have 
~,+f.D,~+MjID,~l-LID;~I+h~O 
at (tj, xj, yj, zj). In addition Dyqh E 0, as 4 depends only on (t, x, z). Hence 
$I+~~~(f.DZb+hi-LlD,dl~o 
at (fj, xj, zj). We let j + 00 to conclude 
91+~~~(S.D~~+h)-LlD;91~0 
at (to, x0, z,,), as required. 
Conversely, suppose for 4 as above that VL - 4 attains a strict local 
minimum at some point (t,, x0, zO). Choose any y, E int Y and select also an 
auxiliary function c: Y + R so that 
[ has compact support in int Y, o<c< 1, 
C(Y,) = 1, C(Y) < 1 for all y# y,. 
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Set 
and note that V” - v/ has a strict local minimum at (t, , x0, y,, z,,). Hence for 
all large enough j, 
vMi-L - 6 has a local minimum at (fj, xj, Yj, ‘j> 
and 
(!j, xj2 Yj3 z,j> + Cf03 xO3 YO2 '0) as j+ co. 
Since V”i9’- is the viscosity solution of (I”I*“) it follows that 
~t+f.D,~+~jlD,rl-LID,~I+h~O 
at (tj, xj, yj, z,~). Discard the term involving Dy[ above and then send j -+ co 
to find 
4,+f.D,4+h-LID,4IGO 
at (to, x0, y,, zo). As y, E int Y was arbitrary we thus obtain 
9,+~~~if.Dx~+hJ-LlD,ml~O 
at (to, x0, zo), as required. 
This completes the proof that V” is the viscosity solution of (IL). By 
uniqueness of this solution we have in fact 
locally uniformly. 
The rest of the proof is similar. Notice 
1% P’fl, ID,VLI, ID,VL/<C~, 
so that there exist Lj+ 00 and a uniformly bounded 
such that 
V’-1 + W locally uniformly. 
Since V’~ solves (IL) a.e. we have 
Lipschitz function W 
so that 
ID, VLjI <g. 
.I 
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Thus 
D, W= 0 a.e. 
and so W = W(t, x) does not depend on z (or y). We claim that W is the 
unique viscosity solution of 
(I+) I W~+~~,“~ayx(f.DxW+h}=O, W(T, x) = 0 
It will then follow that W = V’. 
So let 4 be a C’ function of (t, x) and suppose W - 4 attains a strict local 
minimum at some point (to, x,,). Then for all j large enough, there exist 
(tj, xi, zj) (with zj E Z) such that VLj - # has a local minimum at (tj, xi, zj) 
and (tj, xi)-+ (to, x0) as j+ co. It follows because VLj is the viscosity 
solution of (IL/) that 
at bj, xj, zj). But D,$ = 0 and so 
at (tj, xj). We let (tj, xj) --t (to, x0) to obtain the required estimate 
at (to, x0>. 
On the other hand suppose W - 4 has a strict local maximum at (to, x0). 
Pick any z,, E int Z and select an auxiliary function [: Z + R so that 
[ has compact support in int Z, o<c< 1, 
PO) = 1, C(z) < 1 for all z f zO. 
Define 
and note that W - v/ has a strict local maximum at (t,, x,, , z,,). Here VLj - I// 
has a local maximum at some point (tj, xj, zj) if j is large enough and 
(tj, Xj, 5)’ (to, X0, ZO)* Thus 
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at (tj, xj, zj). We next send j + co to obtain 
at (to, x0, z,,); so that-as z,, E int Z was arbitrary- 
at (to, x0). 
The last inequality completes the proof that W is the viscosity solution of 
(I+). Hence W = V+, and so in fact 
lim VL = lim lim V”,L = V+. I 
L+Cl3 L-co M+cO 
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